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This paper presents ﬁndings from our most recent research on the trans-
formation of participatory employment practices of Japanese ﬁrms in the
1990s, during which the Japanese economy slowed down considerably. The
Japanese experience of employee participation and labor-management co-
operation appears to be of particular public policy interest for many coun-
tries considering participatory employment practices as a way to improve
their productivity performance and thus competitiveness.
As Levine and Tyson (1990) suggest, relatively higher job security and
strong group cohesiveness (supported by the compression of wage and status
diﬀerentials) of workers in large manufacturing ﬁrms in the postwar Japan-
ese economy point to an industrial relations system favorable to successful
employee participation. Moreover, relatively more rapid and stable growth,
lower unemployment, and stable ﬁnancial corporate grouping (banks and in-
stitutional shareholders as stable, long-term suppliers of capital) point to an
external environment favorable to successful employee participation.
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Japanese economy, particularly in manufacturing, participatory employ-
ment practices spread widely and were established ﬁrmly (e.g., see Kato
and Morishima 2002). Indeed, these practices became the hallmark of
“Japanese management,” which in recent years has been inspiring (or in
some instances necessitating) U.S. corporate experimentation with em-
ployee involvement and labor-management cooperation (Levine 1995).
The economic slowdown in the 1990s and a rapidly aging workforce have
allegedly been eroding the aforementioned participation-friendly environ-
ments. A closer look at the recent Japanese experience with participatory
employment practices will help us better understand two key questions re-
garding participation: (a) What are the conditions under which participa-
tory employment practices are best introduced and best sustained? and (b)
in what way will participatory employment practices need to evolve when
external environments change? To address these questions, we have been
gathering and analyzing both quantitative data from national surveys and
qualitative data from our own ﬁeld research on evolving employment prac-
tices in the 1990s. This paper reports the ﬁrst ﬁndings from our analysis of
these data on the responses of Japanese ﬁrms in their use of participatory
employment practices to the economic slowdown in the 1990s.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an
overview of the scope, nature, and eﬀects of participatory employment
practices in postwar Japan (including quantitative evidence on evolving
practices in the 1990s). Section 2.3 presents ﬁndings from our ﬁeld research
on the responses of Japanese ﬁrms in their use of participatory employ-
ment practices to the economic slowdown in the 1990s, and section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 The Scope, Nature, and Eﬀects of Participatory 
Employment Practices in Japan
We ﬁrst provide an overview of participatory employment practices in
Japan, followed by a brief review of the evidence of their eﬀects on ﬁrm per-
formance. For a couple of participatory employment practices (joint labor
management committees and employee stock ownership plans), our
overview also includes quantitative evidence on evolving practices in the
1990s.
2.2.1 Joint Labor-Management Committees: Employee 
Participation and Involvement at the Top
One of the core mechanisms for labor-management relations within a
large Japanese ﬁrm is joint labor-management committees (JLMCs). Es-
tablished at the top (corporate or establishment) level and involving both
management and union representatives, JLMCs serve as a mechanism for
40 Takao Katoemployee participation and involvement at the top level on a large variety
of issues ranging from basic business policies to working conditions.
When there is a union, labor-side representatives are almost always
union representatives, while even in the absence of unions, the majority of
labor-side JLMC members are elected by employee vote (about 70 percent;
Koike 1978). Thus, labor-side JLMC members usually legitimately repre-
sent the interests of the ﬁrm’s workforce.
According to Shimada (1992), JLMCs were one of the many labor-
management institutions proposed at the beginning of 1950s by the Japan
Productivity Center. After a decade of tumultuous labor-management re-
lations between 1945 and 1955, Japanese unions and management, with
the endorsement from the central government, began to implement a
number of well-known human resource management techniques, including
JLMCs and semiannual bonus payments to all employees. According to
Kato and Morishima (2002), in 1960 about 38 percent of all ﬁrms, includ-
ing both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing ﬁrms (close to 50 percent
for manufacturing), had standing JLMCs. During the next decade, use of
the institution spread rapidly. Thus, by 1970 the ﬁgure had risen to close to
60 percent (70 percent for manufacturing). For the next two decades the
use of this institution increased steadily and, as of 1992, fully 80 percent of
all ﬁrms (nearly 90 percent for manufacturing) reported to have standing
JLMCs.
Many observers attribute the peaceful ﬁrm-level labor relations ob-
served in Japanese ﬁrms to the establishment of JLMCs (Shimada 1992;
Inagami 1988). Within JLMCs, which meet almost once a month, a num-
ber of issues are discussed, ranging from basic business policies to social
and athletic activities sponsored by the ﬁrm (see Kato and Morishima
2002).
Finally, we have been collecting and analyzing quantitative data from re-
cent national surveys on the transformation of JLMCs in the 1990s. We
present the ﬁrst ﬁndings from our analysis of such data. The Survey of La-
bor-Management Communications conducted in 1995 by the Ministry of
Labor provides the most recent aggregate data on JLMCs. The same sur-
vey was conducted also in 1988 by the ministry. Using various cross tabu-
lations published from the 1995 survey as well as those from the 1988 sur-
vey, we produced ﬁgure 2.1 and tables 2.1 and 2.2.
First, ﬁgure 2.1 shows how the proportion of establishments with
JLMCs has changed from 1988 to 1995. For all establishments (labeled
“total” in the ﬁgure), the proportion of those with JLMCs has not fallen
signiﬁcantly over this time period, remaining a little below 60 percent.1 In
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1. This ﬁgure is substantially lower than what Kato and Morishima (2002) report. The
sample universe of the survey conducted by Kato and Morishima was the Toyo Keizai Kaisha
Shiki Ho, which provides a list of all ﬁrms listed on Japan’s three major stock exchanges































































5other words, overall, the economic slowdown in the 1990s in general and
the recent banking crisis in particular have not caused any signiﬁcant dis-
mantling of JLMCs.2
Conceivably, the adverse shock might have hit certain sectors of the
economy particularly hard, and for those hard-hit sectors the dismantling
of JLMCs might have begun. To see if this is indeed the case, we repeated
the same analysis for establishments in diﬀerent industries, establishments
of ﬁrms of diﬀering size, and establishments of ﬁrms with and without
unions. As shown in the ﬁgure, the proportion of establishments with
JLMCs has declined noticeably for mining, services, transportation, and
communications, and for nonunion sectors (although it is still premature
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level survey and the sample universe in all establishments with more than thirty workers. It
follows that the Ministry of Labor Surveyincludes many establishments of small private ﬁrms
that are not included in the sample universe of the survey conducted by Kato and Morishima.
This probably accounts for the discrepancy. Fortunately, the Ministry of Labor Surveyalso re-
ports the proportion of establishments with JLMCs for establishments of unionized ﬁrms that
are probably closest to the sample universe of Kato and Morishima. Reassuringly, the ﬁgures
for those establishments were very close to those Kato and Morishima report.
2. We recognize that 1995 may be a little too early to detect the full impact of the economic
slowdown in the 1990s. As shown in the next section, however, qualitative evidence from our
ﬁeld research of summer 1999 tends to conﬁrm this ﬁnding from the quantitative data.
Table 2.1 Average Number of JLMC Meetings per Year and Average Number of








1988 1995 1988 1995
Total 14.2 9.1 3.3 2.8
Mining 5.9 6.6 3.4 2.7
Construction 8.3 7.8 2.8 2.5
Manufacturing 12.5 9.3 3.8 2.7
Electricity and gas services 25.0 18.7 2.8 3.1
Transportation and communications 25.0 11.4 2.4 2.8
Wholesale and retail trade 9.9 8.1 3.7 3.3
Finance, insurance, and real estate 10.8 6.4 3.0 2.5
Services 7.4 8.1 3.4 2.4
For ﬁrms with 5,000+ employees 21.3 12.4 3.2 3.2
For ﬁrms with 1,000–4,999 employees 10.6 8.7 3.8 3.7
For ﬁrms with 300–999 employees 10.3 10.1 3.5 3.0
For ﬁrms with 100–299 employees 8.7 7.6 2.2 2.5
For ﬁrms with 50–99 employees 7.1 7.9 2.2 1.8
With union 15.4 9.8 3.3 3.1
Without union 7.7 7.2 2.7 1.8
Sources: Japan Ministry of Labor (1988, 1995).to consider this an early sign of the crumbling of JLMCs for these sec-
tors).
The absence of evidence for the formal dissolution of JLMCs is probably
not too surprising since, if they decided to end JLMCs, Japanese ﬁrms
would likely make them dormant by changing their attributes (e.g., reduc-
ing the frequency of meetings drastically and trivializing the content of in-
formation shared) rather than formally dissolving them. To this end, we
created tables 2.1 and 2.2, which demonstrate whether various attributes of
JLMCs have changed from 1988 to 1995—and if so, in what way.
Table 2.1 shows the average number of JLMC meetings per year and the
average number of special subcommittees in 1988 and 1995. For all estab-
lishments, the frequency of JLMC meetings fell substantially from four-
teen times a year to nine times a year over the time period. It appears that
when news is consistently bad, JLMCs meet much less frequently. The ﬁg-
ure also points to considerable diﬀerences among sectors. Thus, JLMCs
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Attribute of Establishments with JLMCs 1988 1995 1988 1995
Discusses corporate restructuring 65.4 60.3 48.0 55.9
Discusses hiring and staﬃng 54.0 51.8 44.7 52.1
Discusses transfer of employees 65.0 66.5 45.1 53.8
Discusses layoﬀ 67.3 71.8 51.2 59.0
Discusses mandatory retirement 71.4 75.8 67.0 60.9
Discusses severance pay or pension 67.9 74.2 61.4 56.8
Establishments with JLMCs that discuss each issue
Asks employee representatives for prior consent 
on corporate restructuring 6.1 6.6 6.8 7.0
Asks employee representatives for prior consent 
on hiring and staﬃng 7.0 5.7 8.4 5.5
Asks employee representatives for prior consent 
on transfer of employees 15.4 16.0 19.4 4.0
Asks employee representatives for prior consent 
on layoﬀ 26.2 34.6 22.8 12.2
Asks employee representatives for prior consent 
on mandatory retirement 31.8 37.2 31.2 12.1
Asks employee representatives for prior consent on 
severance pay or pension 33.3 38.6 17.2 9.7
Unionized establishment, union representatives 
participate as employee representatives 88.1 91.4
Nonunionized establishment, employee 
representatives elected by employees 75.2 78.1
Sources: See table 2.1.
Note: Establishments with JLMCs, with or without unions.in transportation and communications held JLMC meetings twenty-ﬁve
times a year in 1988 but only eleven times a year in 1995. The frequency of
JLMC meetings in ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate has also decreased
sharply, from eleven times a year in 1988 to only six times a year in 1995.
JLMCs in larger and unionized ﬁrms experienced a sharper drop in the
frequency of meetings from 1988 to 1995.
Case histories of Japanese JLMCs suggest that JLMCs tend to function
well with a number of special subcommittees, such as a special subcom-
mittee on productivity and a special subcommittee on safety and health
(Japan Productivity Center 1990). As table 2.1 shows, the average number
of special subcommittees for all establishments has declined somewhat
from 3.3 in 1988 to 2.8 in 1995. Some diﬀerences among sectors are also
present. Manufacturing, services, and nonunion sectors experienced larger
decline.
A possible way to weaken information-sharing is to undermine the dem-
ocratic process of selecting employee representatives. In unionized estab-
lishments, the democratic selection of employee representatives is typically
ensured by union representatives participating in JLMCs as employee rep-
resentatives. In nonunion establishments, it is normally ensured through
election by employees. The last two rows of table 2.2 show the proportion
of unionized establishments with JLMCs in which union representatives
participate in JLMCs as employee representatives in 1988 and 1995, and
the proportion of nonunion establishments with JLMCs in which em-
ployee representatives are elected by employees in 1988 and 1995. We failed
to ﬁnd any sign of erosion of the democratic selection of employee repre-
sentatives over this time period.
The nature of employee participation and involvement changes consid-
erably, depending on (a) the content of information shared (e.g., more or
less sharing of information on business and strategic plans, such as sales
and production plans and the introduction of new technology and equip-
ment, as compared to information on labor issues such as layoﬀs, working
hours, wages, and bonuses, fringe beneﬁts, and cultural activities or
sports), and (b) the nature of “consultation” (for instance, whether labor
representatives are “informed only” or “asked for prior consent”). The
Survey of Labor-Management Communication selects sixteen issues (plus
two more issues in 1995), such as basic business strategies, corporate re-
structuring, layoﬀs, and mandatory retirement, and asks each establish-
ment with JLMCs whether it discusses each of these issues during its
JLMC meetings. When the establishment responds positively, it is then
asked whether management asks employee representatives for prior con-
sent.
We selected six issues that are of particular relevance to the economic
slowdown in the 1990s, especially the recent economic crisis, and created
the rest of table 2.2. The table shows the proportion of unionized estab-
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structuring, hiring and staﬃng, transfer of employees, layoﬀs, mandatory
retirement, and severance pay and pension) in 1988 and 1995. It also shows
the same ﬁgures for nonunionized establishments. In addition, the table
shows the proportion of union and nonunion establishments with JLMCs
discussing each of these six issues that asked employee representatives for
prior consent in 1988 and 1995.
For both unionized and nonunionized establishments, JLMCs are more
likely to discuss transfer of employees and layoﬀs in 1995 than in 1988. For
unionized establishments, JLMCs are more likely to discuss mandatory re-
tirement and severance pay or pension in 1995 than in 1988, while they are
less likely to discuss corporate restructuring and hiring and staﬃng in 1995
than in 1988. The opposite pattern is observed for nonunionized establish-
ments. Overall, it is unclear whether JLMCs are more or less likely to dis-
cuss issues of topical relevance in 1995 as compared to 1988.
Nevertheless, when one takes a close look at the nature of consultation
on each of these six issues, a noteworthy diﬀerence between unionized and
nonunionized establishments is revealed. As shown in table 2.2, JLMCs
of unionized establishments discussing transfer of employees, layoﬀs,
mandatory retirement, and severance pay or pension are more likely to ask
employee representatives for prior consent in 1995 as compared to 1988. In
stark contrast, JLMCs of nonunionized establishments discussing transfer
of employees, layoﬀs, mandatory retirement, and severance pay or pension
are much less likely to ask employee representatives for prior consent in
1995 as compared to 1988. This contrast in the changing nature of consul-
tation over this time period between unionized and nonunionized estab-
lishments may suggest that unions eﬀectively prevent JLMCs from be-
coming dormant by keeping the strong consultative role of JLMCs,
whereas for small to medium-sized ﬁrms with no union, such role may be
weakening. As such, unions and JLMCs may be complements rather than
substitutes. At the same time, it suggests that the overall importance of
participation in the Japanese economy may be diminishing with the rising
proportion of the nonunion sector in the economy.3
2.2.2 Shop-Floor Committees and Small-Group Activities: Employee
Participation and Involvement at the Grassroots Level
Aside from JLMCs and formal trade unions, many Japanese corpora-
tions have shop-ﬂoor committees (SFCs) in which supervisors and em-
ployees on the shop ﬂoor discuss issues such as shop-ﬂoor operations and
shop-ﬂoor environments. Although the potentially important role of SFCs
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3. According to the Basic Survey on Labor Unions(Japan Ministry of Labor), the estimated
unionization rate (the number of union members divided by the number of employees) has
been falling in the last three decades, from 35 percent in 1970 to 22 percent in 1999.in the Japanese industrial relations system has been suggested (e.g., see
Koike 1978), the nature and scope of these SFCs have not been studied ex-
tensively, largely due to the absence of reliable data. A recent survey con-
ducted by Kato and Morishima (2002) reveals that the average SFC meets
about nine times a year (slightly less frequently than JLMCs), and that in-
formation shared during the SFC meetings tends to go beyond standard
shop-ﬂoor issues—such as safety and health, fringe beneﬁts, training and
development, and grievances—and includes business and strategic plans.
As such, SFCs are aimed at employee participation and involvement at the
grassroots level.
Kato and Morishima (2002) also reveal the diﬀusion of SFCs among
Japanese ﬁrms in the postwar era. In 1960, a little over 10 percent of all
ﬁrms including both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing ﬁrms (15 per-
cent for manufacturing) each had a standing SFC. Since then, the institu-
tion spread steadily; in 1992 more than 40 percent of all ﬁrms reported hav-
ing standing SFCs (45 percent for manufacturing ﬁrms).
Small-group activities (SGAs) are those such as quality control (QC)
circles and “zero defects” in which small groups at the workplace level vol-
untarily set plans and goals concerning operations and work together to
accomplishing these plans and goals. The widespread use of SGAs such as
QC circles by Japanese ﬁrms is, by now, quite well known (e.g., see Cole
1989). In 1950 almost no ﬁrms (only 3 percent) used SGAs. In 1960 only 6
percent of publicly traded ﬁrms had SGAs. The rapid diﬀusion of the in-
stitution began in 1960s. By the beginning of 1970s, about one in four pub-
licly traded ﬁrms were practicing an SGA, and the ﬁgure reached 44 per-
cent in 1980. Since then the institution has grown steadily; in 1993, 70
percent of publicly traded ﬁrms reported practicing SGAs (Kato 1995).
Small-group activities are clearly more popular among larger ﬁrms (80
percent of ﬁrms with 5,000 or more employees practice SGAs as opposed
to 43 percent of ﬁrms with 299 or fewer). Moreover, SGAs are more wide-
spread in the unionized sector (Kato 1995).
2.2.3 Employee Stock Ownership Plans:
Financial Participation via Stock
Japanese employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are perhaps best un-
derstood by comparison of their main features with the better-known U.S.
ESOPs. Unlike U.S. ESOPs, Japanese corporations establishing ESOPs
(called mochikabukai) do not receive any tax incentive to do so. To induce
individual employees to participate in the ESOPs, companies oﬀer subsi-
dies (typically the ﬁrm matches each employee’s contribution by giving 5 to
10 percent of the contribution as well as bearing the administrative costs).
Whereas ESOPs elsewhere frequently are structured so as to encourage
strong participation by top management, in Japan executives (as well as
part-time and temporary employees) are normally ineligible for member-
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dends) in the ESOP are held in trust. Unusually, however, each participant
has a right to withdraw his or her shares, and share withdrawals are pri-
vately owned. Withdrawals are permitted only in 1,000 shares, round lots.
While members may freely exit completely from the ESOP, reentry is re-
stricted. Exiting employees will receive their shares in 1,000 shares, round
lots, and must sell the remaining shares to the trust at the prevailing market
price. Upon retirement, model rules adopted by most ESOPs require retir-
ing workers to exit completely from the ESOP. Finally, the general director
(rijicho) represents stockholders in the ESOP. The general director is chosen
by other participants, on a one-participant, one-vote basis. At the general
meeting of shareholders, the general director votes the stock held by the
plan, deciding independently rather than by tabulating votes of employee
participants. The general director must be a participant in the ESOP and
thus is not an executive (Jones and Kato 1993, 1995).
The survey conducted by Kato and Morishima (2002) shows that the
ESOPs are a relatively new and the most rapidly spread innovation among
various Japanese human resource management practices. Thus, in 1960 the
proportion of ﬁrms that had ESOPs was only 4 percent. The proportion
grew rapidly during the next decade, reaching 26 percent by 1970. In 1967,
a special government committee on foreign capital advocated employee
ownership as a way to help prevent foreign takeovers of domestic ﬁrms.
The government, using informal channels, encouraged ﬁrms to set up new
ESOP trusts to accommodate employee investments in their stock. While
the fear of foreign takeovers diminished in the 1970s, the idea of employee
ownership took root. Perhaps partly due to this government initiative of
1967, the 1970s were characterized by an astonishing rate of spread of the
institution, and more than two-thirds of ﬁrms came to have ESOPs by
1980. The diﬀusion continued even after 1980, and in 1992 it became al-
most a universal phenomenon (96 percent of ﬁrms reported to have ESOPs
in that year, and there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between manufacturing
and nonmanufacturing ﬁrms).
The survey also shows that in 1993, almost 50 percent of the labor force
in ﬁrms with ESOPs participated in ESOPs. Furthermore, concerning em-
ployee stakes, Jones and Kato (1995) report that in 1988 ESOPs owned
stock worth 4.1 trillion yen (about 32 billion dollars); this amounts to 1.7
million yen (about 14,000 dollars) per participant.
However, according to Jones and Kato (1995), these plans do not own
large percentages of company stock. For listed companies the average pro-
portion of stock owned by ESOPs has varied between 0.66 percent and
1.42 percent from 1973 to 1988. In 1988 the average was lower than 1 per-
cent and holdings over 5 percent were rare.
Finally, we have been collecting and analyzing quantitative data from re-
cent national surveys on the transformation of ESOPs in the 1990s. The
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annually the Survey of Stock Distribution to which all ﬁrms listed on
Japan’s stock exchange markets respond. The National Conference Board
has recently released summary tables from their 1997 survey. Using these
most recently published summary tables as well as earlier tables, we created
ﬁgure 2.2.4
In the 1980s, the share prices of most large corporations in Japan rose
steadily. It is not too surprising under such steady growth of corporate
proﬁtability that ESOPs gained increasing popularity in Japan. Thus, as
shown in ﬁgure 2.2, both the proportion of ﬁrms with ESOPs and the
ESOP participation rate (the proportion of the labor force employed by
ﬁrms with ESOPs and participating in those ESOPs) grew steadily in the
1980s. Moreover, the real market value of outstanding shares owned by
ESOPs more than quadrupled and the real market value of outstanding
shares owned by ESOPs per participant (the real value of the average
stake) more than doubled in the 1980s. The National Conference Board
also published the average price of shares owned by ESOPs (the market
value of outstanding shares owned by ESOPs divided by the total number
of shares owned by ESOPs). The real value of this average price tripled in
the 1980s.
The steady growth of share prices ended rather abruptly at the end of the
1980s. For instance, the average ﬁrm listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
lost more than half its value in the early 1990s (Kang and Stulz 1997). Re-
ﬂecting this rapid asset price deﬂation in the early 1990s, the real market
value of outstanding shares owned by ESOPs, the real value of the average
stake, and the real value of the average price of shares owned by ESOPs fell
sharply in the early 1990s. As shown in ﬁgure 2.2, recovery from this sharp
drop has been anemic.
A natural question concerning the responses of ESOPs to this seemingly
powerful adverse shock is whether this shock has been discouraging em-
ployees from participating in ESOPs. Figure 2.2 shows a surprisingly calm
response of the labor force in ﬁrms with ESOPs. The ESOP participation
rate has not fallen in any signiﬁcant way in the 1990s although its steady in-
crease in the 1980s did stop in the 1990s: The ESOP participation rate rose
in the 1980s by 9 percentage points, from 40 to 49 percent, and has re-
mained at the 49 percent level in the 1990s. It is unclear, however, whether
the stagnation of the participation rate in the 1990s was caused by the ad-
verse ﬁnancial shocks. At any rate, there has been no sign of a frenzied exit
of participants from ESOPs in response to the adverse ﬁnancial shock in
the 1990s.
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4. Although the survey began in 1973, data on the market value of outstanding shares
owned by ESOPs became available only in 1979. Thus, our complete data on the evolution of
































7Consistent with this relatively calm employees response, very few em-
ployers have terminated their ESOPs in response to the adverse ﬁnancial
shock. Thus, as shown in ﬁgure 2.2, the proportion of ﬁrms with ESOPs
has not fallen in the 1990s and ESOPs have continued to be a nearly uni-
versal phenomenon among publicly traded ﬁrms in Japan (95 percent of all
publicly traded ﬁrms have ESOPs).
Overall, it appears that neither employees nor employers have panicked
in the face of the adverse ﬁnancial shock in the 1990s. In addition to the
summary table for all publicly traded ﬁrms, the National Conference
Board publishes the summary table for two-digit industries. Conceivably,
the adverse shock might have hit certain industries particularly hard, and
for those hard-hit industries, many ESOPs might have been terminated
and the ESOP participation rate might have fallen signiﬁcantly. To see if
this is the case, we repeated the same analysis for each of 28 two-digit in-
dustries. We failed to ﬁnd any noteworthy example of such industries.
2.2.4 Proﬁt-Sharing Plans: Financial Participation via Bonus
A proﬁt-sharing plan (PSP) is a pay system in which the total amount of
bonuses is linked to a measure of ﬁrm performance, such as proﬁt. The
Japanese bonus payment system has attracted considerable attention and
controversy (e.g., Freeman and Weitzman 1987; Nakamura and Naka-
mura 1989; Hashimoto 1990; Hart and Kawasaki 1995). In light of the on-
going debate between those who stress the proﬁt-sharing aspect of the
Japanese bonus system (e.g., Freeman and Weitzman 1987) and those who
downplay it (e.g., Ohashi 1989; Brunello 1991), we consider only the least
controversial (with respect to the proﬁt-sharing aspect) types of the bonus
payment system—that is the bonus payment system with a formal contract
stipulating the presence of the PSP.
According to Kato and Morishima (2002), one in four publicly traded
ﬁrms had a PSP in 1993 (with no appreciable diﬀerence between manufac-
turing and nonmanufacturing ﬁrms). The proportion of publicly traded
ﬁrms with PSPs was only 5 percent in 1960 and grew steadily to 14 percent
by 1980. Signiﬁcant growth occurred during the 1980s, however, with the
proportion of publicly traded ﬁrms with PSPs reaching more than 20 per-
cent by 1990.
Proﬁt-sharing plans are found to be more prevalent in smaller ﬁrms. For
instance, the proportion of publicly traded ﬁrms with 5,000 or more em-
ployees and having any PSP was only 11 percent. The large majority (70
percent) of ﬁrms with PSPs reported separate proﬁt-sharing plans for oﬃc-
ers and nonoﬃcers. However, Japanese PSPs do not normally distinguish
between union and nonunion members (only one-third of ﬁrms with PSPs
reported separate PSPs for union and nonunion members). Proﬁt-sharing
plans are mostly company-wide, with only 12 percent of ﬁrms with PSPs
reporting separate plans for diﬀerent divisions and occupations. Moreover,
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trast to the United States where deferred plans are more popular (see
Kruse 1993, 16–17). Because they are almost always cash plans, Japanese
PSPs have no tax advantage (Kato and Morishima 2002).
Kato and Morishima (2002) also report that the majority (55 percent) of
Japanese PSPs lack set formulas (or are fully discretionary) for how the
contribution should be tied to proﬁts, which is also in contrast to PSPs in
the United States, where only 22 percent are fully discretionary (Kruse
1993, 75).
2.2.5 Evidence on Their Eﬀects
In spite of the importance of the postwar Japanese experience with par-
ticipatory employment practices, there has been little systematic investiga-
tion of the economic eﬀects of participatory employment practices in
Japan.5 For the economic eﬀects of ﬁnancial participation, the Japanese
bonus payment system has attracted considerable attention and contro-
versy, in particular the claim that it is a form of PSP. Earlier studies focused
on the eﬀects on employment of the Japanese bonus payment system (e.g.,
see Freeman and Weitzman 1987 and Brunello 1991). More recent studies
turned to the issue of the productivity eﬀects of the Japanese bonus pay-
ment system. Jones and Kato (1995) use ﬁrm-level panel data to ﬁnd that
there is a modest productivity gain from the bonus system. Ohkusa and
Ohtake (1997) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with statistically signiﬁcant positive correla-
tion between their wages and per capita proﬁts are 9 percent more produc-
tive than ﬁrms with no such correlation. For ESOPs, Jones and Kato (1995)
use ﬁrm-level panel data to ﬁnd that the introduction of an ESOP will lead
to a 4 to 5 percent increase in productivity and that this productivity payoﬀ
does not appear immediately.
For the economic eﬀects of information sharing at the top level, Mor-
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5. For U.S. corporations, however, we are presently witnessing an impressive growth of ev-
idence. See, for example, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), Black and Lynch (2001),
Freeman and Kleiner (1998), Helper (1998), Bartel (2000), Freeman and Kleiner (2000), and
articles featured in a special issue of Industrial Relations (July 1996, vol. 35). Many of these
recent studies in the United States use plant-level (branch-level) panel data within a narrowly
deﬁned industry. The beneﬁts of using such data are probably less dramatic for Japan than
for the United States since Japanese ﬁrms generally are substantially smaller (e.g., see Kato
and Rockel’s 1992 comparative study of the 1,000 most valuable corporations between the two
nations), and their management appears to be less decentralized than that of U.S. ﬁrms.
Based on our interviews with managers in human resources at the corporate level and top
managers in marketing/sales and accounting/ﬁnance at the business-unit level of Japanese
and U.S. corporations, the power of human resource departments at the corporate level rela-
tive to top management at the business-unit level appears to be much stronger in Japan than
in the United States. In addition, as Jones and Kato (1995) and Kato and Morishima (2002)
show, there are substantial lags (up to seven years) in the productivity eﬀects of participatory
employment practices in Japan. Plant-level data seldom provide long longitudinal data and
thus may not be as useful in the context of the postwar Japanese experience as in the context
of the current U.S. experimentation.ishima (1991a, b) use ﬁrm-level microdata to ﬁnd the statistically signiﬁ-
cant positive correlations between the extent of information sharing
through JLMCs and productivity, and the statistically signiﬁcant correla-
tions between stronger JLMCs and shorter and smoother wage negotia-
tion. More recently, Tsuru and Morishima (1999) use two unique data sets,
one from a survey of ﬁrms and the other from a survey of employees, and
ﬁnd evidence for positive correlations between the presence of JLMCs and
the strength of “employee voice.”
Finally, Kato and Morishima (2002) ﬁnd evidence of the importance of
introducing groups of participatory employment practices in the following
three areas: (a) employee participation and involvement at the top level;
(b) employee participation and involvement at the grassroots level; and
(c)ﬁnancial participation. Speciﬁcally, moving from the traditional system
of no participatory employment practices to a highly participatory system
with participatory employment practices in all three areas led to a signiﬁ-
cant 8 to 9 percent increase in productivity. The full productivity eﬀect,
however, is felt only after a fairly long developmental phase (seven years).
At the same time, they ﬁnd no evidence for signiﬁcant productivity gains
from changing the industrial relations system from the traditional system
to any intermediate systems that lack participatory employment practices
in at least one of the three key areas.
In sum, there is evidence for the positive eﬀects of participatory em-
ployment practices in Japan in the postwar period, supporting the idea that
such practices help align the interest of the ﬁrm with the interest of its em-
ployees and encourage speciﬁc human capital accumulation of employees.6
In addition, recent ﬁndings from Kato and Morishima (2002) suggest that
the goal alignment process needs to be supported by both direct methods
(ﬁnancial participation) and indirect ones (information sharing). Further-
more, information sharing needs to take place not only at the top level but
at the grassroots level, as well. In other words, the goal-alignment process
occurs most strongly when the interests of the two parties are aligned
through ﬁnancial participation and when this interest alignment is facili-
tated by mechanisms at both the top and the grassroots levels, which cur-
tails parties’ opportunistic behavior.
Kato and Morishima’s (2002) ﬁndings also point to the importance of a
long-term perspective in evaluating the success of participatory employ-
ment practices. First, it does take time for the goal alignment process to
take root. It is highly unlikely that instituting a participatory employment
practice will instantly create signiﬁcant interest alignment of groups of em-
ployees with the ﬁrm.7 Furthermore, there is substantial learning by doing
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6. See Kato and Morishima (2002) for further discussion on the goal-alignment and hu-
man-capital eﬀects of these practices, as well as their complementarity eﬀects.
7. For similar arguments, see Pil and MacDuﬃe (1996) and Ichniowski and Shaw (1995).in the evolution of participatory employment practices, which “mature”
over time—and only mature participatory employment practices tend to
yield signiﬁcant productivity gains.
2.3 Evolving Practices in the 1990s: Evidence from Field Research
In the summer of 1999, we conducted ﬁeld research at a number of
Japanese ﬁrms. We had written them the previous winter, asking them to
locate and assemble some speciﬁc data on participatory employment prac-
tices of their ﬁrms and detailing what kind of questions we intended to
ask when we visited them that summer.8 An obvious advantage of ﬁeld re-
search is that such research allows for more detailed and richer analysis;
but there is also an added advantage. The quantitative data from national
surveys are usually not available for the latter half of the 1990s. For ex-
ample, in the previous section, the lack of available data on JLMCs after
1995 forced us to compare 1988 to 1995. Conceivably, the impact of the
economic slowdown in general and ﬁnancial crisis in particular on JLMCs
may be felt only after 1995. Our ﬁeld research from summer 1999 provides
the most recent picture of employment practices. Below we present a num-
ber of key ﬁndings from the ﬁeld research.9
2.3.1 The Quantity and Quality of Information
Shared During JLMC Meetings
In general, our ﬁeld research provides very little evidence for reduction
in the quantity and quality of information shared through JLMCs in the
1990s.
Firm A is a large manufacturing ﬁrm with sales of more than 3 trillion
yen (nearly half of which is export sales) and employment of close to 40,000
workers in 1998. It is listed in the ﬁrst section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
In the 1990s the ﬁrm’s performance worsened substantially and became
much more volatile. It cut 30 percent of its labor force throughout the
1990s, from about 57,000 to about 40,000. The corporation consists of
eleven establishments.
On 10 June 1999 we visited the headquarters of ﬁrm A. We met with the
personnel manager, our primary interviewee, in the personnel department.
The interview lasted about four hours. The manager’s young subordinate
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8. We asked Professor Koike of Hosei University, Mr. Nakashima and Mr. Koike of Rengo-
Soken (RENGO Research Institute for Advancement of Living Standards), and Mr. Fuku-
tani of JPC-SED to introduce us to more than a dozen large Japanese ﬁrms, including both
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing. We wrote all of these ﬁrms to which they introduced
to us. In our letters, we asked them to collect speciﬁc data on their participatory employment
practices, and explained what sort of questions we planned to ask when we visited them. All
of the ﬁrms we wrote agreed to cooperate with us fully. In addition, Professor Fujimura of Ho-
sei University introduced us to a medium-sized ﬁrm (referred to as ﬁrm C later in the text).
9. See Kato (2000) for a more detailed report of the ﬁeld research.was also present during the interview and provided some additional infor-
mation. We had written them several months prior to our visit, asking
them to locate and assemble some speciﬁc data and detailing what kinds of
questions we intended to ask. They took our request very seriously and
spent much time and eﬀort to prepare conﬁdential data for us.
On the next day, we visited establishment P of this ﬁrm and spent over
half an hour observing a number of shop ﬂoors of this establishment. We
then interviewed a foreman who is in charge of a section (called kakari). He
reports to department chief (kacho) and has six unit chiefs (kocho) report-
ing to him. Each unit consists of about ten to ﬁfteen workers. The foreman
had spent over thirty years in this department and was about to be pro-
moted to kacho. The interview lasted a little over an hour, focusing on
SFCs and SGAs.
On 16 June 1999 we visited ﬁrm A’s union headquarters and interviewed
our primary interviewee (the vice president of the union) for about two
hours. We were also given an opportunity to interview his young staﬀ
members (full-time union oﬃcials) for a little over an hour. Our primary
interviewee was the union’s number-two person and attended all JLMCs at
the headquarters level. Our secondary interviewees worked very closely
with him and engaged in the day-to-day activities of JLMCs. Several
months prior to our visit, we had also written them a letter similar to the
one we had sent to our personnel interviewees, asking them to locate and
assemble some speciﬁc data and detailing what kind of questions we in-
tended to ask. They, too, took our request very seriously and spent a lot of
time and eﬀort preparing conﬁdential data for us.
At ﬁrm A, JLMCs existed at least in 1955. Initially, JLMCs were func-
tioning as mechanisms for management to explain their decisions ex post
to union representatives. However, due in part to the presence of charis-
matic and aggressive union leader, JLMCs by 1985 had changed their role
from information sharing to joint decision making. For example, during
JLMC meetings, union representatives tried to veto management’s deci-
sion to open a new plant overseas. Following the resignation of the union
leader in 1985, the joint-decision-making aspect of JLMCs was signiﬁ-
cantly reduced in 1986, and the current form of JLMC was established.
JLMCs at the headquarters level of ﬁrm A consist of ﬁve types of meet-
ings: (a) management council meetings; (b) committee meetings; (c) re-
structuring meetings; (d) production meetings; and (e) individual item
meetings. At management council meetings, six to seven top managers
(chief executive oﬃcer [CEO], vice-CEOs, and the director of personnel)
meet with six to seven top full-time union oﬃcials regularly. Each meeting
lasts half a day. Business strategies and plans and the current status of cor-
porate performance are discussed. The management council meetings are
normally held twice a year. They are scheduled right before spring wage
oﬀensive and fall collective bargaining so that they can help facilitate each
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of JLMCs in the 1990s.
The union begins its preparation for management council meetings a
month prior to each meeting. A full-time union oﬃcial visits various shop
ﬂoors and talks to union representatives of establishments to ﬁnd out what
union members are concerned about and what they want to know from
management. This is very time and eﬀort consuming. Based on this ﬁeld re-
search, the oﬃcial writes up a list of questions. It is imperative to have care-
ful ﬁeld research to gather information from shop ﬂoors. For example,
careful ﬁeld research at the shop-ﬂoor level revealed that in spite of
management’s overall decision to reduce a number of products it sells, the
reduction was not really happening—although on paper it looked as if it
were happening.
A list of questions is then given to management seven to ten days prior
to the meeting, and management prepares responses to those questions. At
the management council meeting, management presents an answer to each
question and the union asks further questions about the answer. After the
meeting, both management and union prepare separate proceedings and
exchange each other’s proceedings before dissemination. Some informa-
tion shared during meetings is designated as conﬁdential and is excluded
from the proceedings. Union proceedings are distributed to all union mem-
bers and management proceedings are distributed to all managers.
JLMCs at the headquarters level of ﬁrm A have a number of subcom-
mittees, including the subcommittee on production, the subcommittee on
employee beneﬁts and welfare, the subcommittee on sales, and the sub-
committee on development. Subcommittee meetings on production are
held regularly twice a year and are attended by six to seven managers from
the production department, domestic sales department, export sales de-
partment, and personnel department, and six to seven top full-time union
oﬃcials. Biannual production and staﬃng plans are discussed. In addition
to production subcommittee meetings, occasionally other subcommittee
meetings (such as those of the subcommittee on employee beneﬁts and wel-
fare, the subcommittee on sales, and subcommittee on development) are
also held.
Restructuring meetings are held on an ad hoc basis. Decentraliza-
tion, outsourcing, and plant closures are discussed. Production meet-
ings are also held on an ad hoc basis.10 Unlike committee meetings on
production that discuss the overall framework of employment adjust-
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10. Our primary union interviewee and personnel interviewee provided slightly conﬂicting
views on production meetings. According to our personnel interviewee, they are held regu-
larly on a monthly basis. According to the data provided by our union interviewee, as shown
in ﬁgure 2.3, there were fourteen production meetings in 1998. As far as 1998 is concerned,
they were indeed held monthly (actually, slightly more often than monthly). However, in the
previous years, it was clear that they met less often than monthly.ments, production meetings deal with actual employment changes in re-
sponse to changes in output demand. Individual item meetings are held
also on an ad hoc basis to discuss items other than what is covered in
other meetings.
There is no evidence for reduction in the quantity of information shared
through JLMCs in the 1990s. First, there has been no apparent decline in
the frequency of meetings in the 1990s. As shown in ﬁgure 2.3, the total
number of JLMC meetings at the headquarters level reached twenty per
year in 1992 and kept exceeding twenty until 1995. The number fell a little
for the next three years. This is somewhat consistent with our national sur-
vey ﬁnding of a declining meeting frequency from 1988 to 1995, as pre-
sented in the previous section. However, in 1998, it reached an all-time high
level of ﬁfty-one meetings a year. Most of the increase came from restruc-
turing meetings and production meetings. Management council meetings
and subcommittee meetings on production stayed pretty much the same
over this period.
To be consistent with this increased frequency of meetings, our union in-
terviewee felt that the amount of information shared during JLMC meet-
ings increased in the 1990s. Our personnel manager interviewee noticed
that unions have been increasingly concerned about basic business-
strategy questions that only the CEO or chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer (CFO) could
answer. Consequently, the information shared during JLMC meetings has
become more concerned with business strategies than with more directly
labor-related issues (such as employee welfare and beneﬁts) and can be said
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Fig. 2.3 Changes in the frequency of JLMC meetings at the headquarters level
over time: Firm Ato be more “conﬁdential.” Our personnel interviewee added that discus-
sion on restructuring (such as decentralization, outsourcing, plant clo-
sures, or selling oﬀsegments of the business) naturally had increased in the
last few years. This is reﬂected in an increase in the number of restructur-
ing meetings in the last few years.
Our union interviewee believed that the quality of information shared
had also risen in the 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s, news was almost always
good. Wages and bonuses were rising faster than those of the ﬁrm’s major
competitors. There was very little concern about ﬁrm performance, wages,
bonuses, and employment security among employees. The quality of in-
formation shared during JLMC meetings was not of prime concern. In
the1990s, however, ﬁrm performance worsened, annual raises of wages and
bonuses stagnated, and employees became more concerned about their
employment security. The quality of information shared began to be of ma-
jor concern. Our primary union interviewee said, “When the rank and ﬁles
are asked to accept zero increase in bonus, for example, they do demand a
detailed and convincing justiﬁcation.”
Our primary union interviewee believed that some of the information he
received from top management could be considered “insider information”
and that top management asked him not to release it to other union mem-
bers. To maintain a good relationship with top management, he did keep
such information in strict conﬁdence. Our secondary union interviewees
echo this by saying that most information was shared with them before it
was made public knowledge and that it would be possible to use some of
the information shared during JLMC meetings to make money in the stock
market (i.e., some of the information shared during JLMC meetings could
be insider-trading material). They quickly added that they did not engage
in such activities.
Firm B is a large manufacturer with sales of a few trillion yen (about one-
quarter of which is export sales) and employment of close to 20,000 work-
ers in 1998. It is also listed in the ﬁrst section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
The ﬁrm has over ten establishments. Similar to that of ﬁrm A, the ﬁrm
performance of ﬁrm B continued to worsen in the 1990s, and it cut almost
50 percent of its labor force during that time. On 26 May 1999 we visited
the headquarters of the ﬁrm. We met with our primary interviewee in per-
sonnel (the general manager of labor relations in the personnel and labor
relations division) ﬁrst. The interview lasted about three hours, including
lunch. After lunch, we met with our secondary interviewee in personnel
(the manager of labor relations) for an hour and half. As in the case of ﬁrm
A, we had written these individuals several months earlier, asking them to
locate and assemble some speciﬁc data and detailing what kind of ques-
tions we intended to ask. They took our request seriously and spent much
time and eﬀort to prepare a variety of in-house data for us.
After our visit to ﬁrm headquarters, we went to the union headquarters
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ber two in the organization). The interview lasted over one hour. Several
months earlier we had written him a letter similar to the one we had sent
our personnel interviewees, asking them to locate and assemble some spe-
ciﬁc data and detailing what kind of questions we intended to ask. They
also took our request very seriously and prepared in-house data for us.
JLMCs existed at least in 1970 in ﬁrm B. JLMCs at the headquarters
level consist of two types of meetings: (a) management council meetings
and (b) labor-management committee meetings. Management council
consists of a group of top management (CEO, vice-CEOs, and other di-
rectors) and a group of ten full-time union oﬃcials at the headquarters.
There are two biannual council meetings and four quarterly council meet-
ings a year at the headquarters level. The chief executive oﬃcer and vice-
CEOs attend the biannual meetings, which convene right at the biannual
accounting-report time, but do not attend the quarterly meetings. Union
representatives from each establishment also attend these biannual coun-
cil meetings. Each meeting normally begins at 11 .. and ends at 5 ..
with an informal luncheon. Management explains its production plans, in-
troduction of new equipment, temporary and permanent closing of plants
and equipment, and major organizational changes. The union asks for
their justiﬁcations.
The labor-management committee consists of the director of personnel,
his or her subordinates, and a group of ten full-time union oﬃcials at the
headquarters level. The committee meets on an ad hoc basis. Depending
on the issue, full-time union representatives of relevant establishments may
attend these committee meetings. Management explains staﬃng changes
resulting from new production plans, such as worksharing, layoﬀs, sub-
stantial transfers of employees, welfare beneﬁts, fringe beneﬁts, and health
and safety. The union negotiates with management on these issues.
Management council meetings and labor-management committee meet-
ings are complementary. For example, a plant closure plan is proposed to
the management council meeting and the union asks for its justiﬁcation
there. Labor-management committee meetings work out an agreement on
the size of and conditions for labor transfers as a result of the plant closure.
There has not been any major change in the basic framework of JLMCs.
Like in the case of ﬁrm A, our primary personnel interviewee at ﬁrm B
strongly objected to the popular notion of a weakening of JLMCs in recent
years, by arguing that both the quantity and quality of information shared
during JLMC meetings increased in the 1990s. “When things are going
well, it may not be crucial to have a good labor-management relationship.
However, when the ﬁrm is faced with serious competition, it is imperative
to have a good labor-management relationship and make decisions, based
on good discussion between labor and management.”
To be consistent with his remarks, there has been no indication of a de-
Participatory Employment Practices in Japan 59cline in the frequency of JLMC meetings. As shown in ﬁgure 2.4,we see no
downward trend in the total number of JLMC meetings per year in the
1990s. Please note that the numbers for management council meetings and
labor-management committee meetings include headquarters-level meet-
ings as well as establishment-level meetings, and therefore that they tend to
be quite high.
We were fortunate to be able to study the proceedings of their most re-
cent biannual management council meeting and those from ten years ago.
These proceedings are distributed to union representatives from each es-
tablishment. Those from ten years ago were very detailed and were close to
a word-for-word transcription of the actual meetings. In stark contrast,
more recent proceedings were less detailed and were closer to executive
summaries. According to our union interviewee, compared to ten years
ago the ﬁrm is facing a much more competitive environment and union
members are much more concerned about ﬁrm performance and their em-
ployment and earnings. To reﬂect these changes, the union’s needs for
deeper information about ﬁrm performance and business strategies and
plans have risen substantially. As a result, the union has been asking more
and deeper questions during JLMC meetings, and therefore has been ac-
quiring deeper and more detailed information about ﬁrm performance and
business strategies and plans. The word-for-word proceedings of such
meetings might lead to leaking of some conﬁdential information. Also, he
suggested that the union is looking for more than superﬁcial answers to
their questions from management and that management tends to be more
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Fig. 2.4 Changes in the frequency of JLMC meetings and collective bargaining
over time: Firm Bforthcoming when they know that their words are not going to be pub-
lished in the proceedings. In parallel to this increased quality and quantity
of information shared during JLMCs, the union oﬀers alternative plans
more often than before.
In addition to ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B, we also conducted ﬁeld research at six
other large manufacturing ﬁrms, two large retail chain stores, and one large
city bank, all of which tell essentially the same story. However, we learned
a somewhat diﬀerent tale from ﬁrm C, a medium-sized manufacturing ﬁrm
with sales of 150 billion yen and employment of over 2,000 workers in 1997.
Unlike ﬁrm A, ﬁrm B, and other large ﬁrms that we visited, ﬁrm C is not
publicly traded. On 23 June 1999, we visited the headquarters of that ﬁrm
and interviewed the president of the ﬁrm’s union. He has been the presi-
dent over twenty years. The interview lasted about two hours. After that,
we met with our interviewee in personnel (manager of the personnel de-
partment) for about an hour. Again, we had written these individuals a few
weeks prior to our visit, asking them to locate and assemble some speciﬁc
data and detailing what kind of questions we intended to ask. They took
our request seriously and prepared conﬁdential data for us.
Performance of ﬁrm C clearly worsened in the 1990s. Inﬂation-adjusted
real sales peaked in 1990 and then continued to fall until 1994, when real
sales were at almost half their 1990 level. Since then, recovery of real sales
has been sluggish at best. Real net proﬁt (after tax), return on assets and re-
turn on equity continued to decline in the early 1990s and experienced neg-
ative proﬁt two years in a row (until this time, the ﬁrm had never experi-
enced negative proﬁt since its founding in 1945). Since then, recovery of
proﬁtability has still been rather weak. The ﬁrm began downsizing its
workforce in 1993, and by 1997 the ﬁrm’s employment became almost 80
percent of its 1992 level.
The ﬁrm has JLMCs only at the headquarters level. JLMCs began in
1970. However, until 1978, JLMCs held informal meetings three or four
times a year in which labor and management exchanged ideas with no spe-
ciﬁc agenda. JLMCs were formalized in 1978, with speciﬁc agenda set for
each meeting. In the 1990s, they started to hold meetings regularly once a
month. In addition, upon request of either management or the union,
JLMC meetings can be held on an ad hoc basis. In fact, to discuss the pres-
ent issue of permanent transfers of workers to related ﬁrms, one of those
ad hoc JLMC meetings was scheduled in the afternoon of our visit to the
ﬁrm. Each meeting lasts four hours. In addition, subcommittees are occa-
sionally formed to discuss speciﬁc issues. For example, currently they have
one subcommittee on the issue of extending the mandatory retirement age
from sixty to sixty-two.
Unlike in the case of large, publicly traded ﬁrms, top management of this
ﬁrm proposed to reduce the frequency of JLMC meetings and shorten the
length of each meeting from four to two hours. Top management argued
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agement. Our union interviewee was skeptical about this proposal. He
feared that this might make JLMCs more superﬁcial. Based on his twenty-
year experience with JLMCs, only with ample time for discussion is im-
portant information revealed during JLMC meetings.
Regular participants in the JLMC from the management side include
vice-CEOs, other executives, and the director of personnel (six to seven ex-
ecutives in total). The CEO used to attend all JLMC meetings before 1990.
However, at the union’s suggestion, since 1990 the CEO has attended only
a couple of meetings a year when wage negotiation is complete. Depending
on the agenda items, top managers of the relevant establishments also at-
tend. Regular participants from the union side include union oﬃcials at the
headquarters level and union representatives from each of the ﬁve estab-
lishments (ten to twelve oﬃcials in total).
Unlike in the case of large, publicly traded ﬁrms, most of the time the
union does not tell management in advance what kinds of questions it will
ask. However, when either management or the union has a particularly im-
portant issue, the issue will be discussed prior to JLMC meetings between
the director of personnel and top union oﬃcials at the headquarters level.
By the time an actual proposal is submitted to the JLMC, it has already
been revised to incorporate union input.
During each monthly JLMC meeting, management presents and ex-
plains monthly data on orders, sales, production, and sales proﬁt for each
establishment. Occasionally, management does share some very conﬁden-
tial information, such as development of new products and the opening
and closure of plants, with the union during JLMC meetings. Management
asks the union to keep such information in conﬁdence. Since JLMC meet-
ings were formalized in 1978, there has not been any incidence of conﬁ-
dential information leaking outside the ﬁrm. Our union interviewee felt
that he had developed a good, trusting relationship with management and
that management did not hide conﬁdential information from him.
To  conclude the section on the quantity and quality of information
shared during JLMC meetings, we address an issue raised by critics of
participatory management—in particular, of JLMCs—that participatory
management is too time consuming and that it cannot adjust eﬀectively to
a rapidly changing competitive environment. Critics also argue that it con-
sumes too much management, union, and general-employee eﬀort that
could be used for more productive activities.
Both management and the unions of our large, publicly traded ﬁrms ar-
gued that JLMCs rarely delay important management decisions, and
stressed the beneﬁts of having a labor force that is thoroughly educated
about and supportive of management’s plans, which results from having
good JLMCs. When management decisions are actually implemented,
there are no surprises, no misunderstandings, and no confusion among
62 Takao Katoemployees, which makes the process of implementation smooth and
prompt. Our personnel interviewee of ﬁrm A, however, recognized that the
ﬁrm did experience a major delay in its decision to open a plant overseas
due to its union’s strong objection in 1985, and that the current system was
built on the premise that the same problem should not happen again. He
further added that restructuring meetings and individual item meetings
could be held immediately at either management’s or labor’s request. The
increased use of these meetings (as opposed to more regular meetings, such
as management council meetings) can be viewed as a mechanism to achieve
timely management within the existing framework of JLMCs.
In contrast, top management of our medium-sized, privately held ﬁrm,
ﬁrm C, appears to subscribe somewhat to the beliefs held by critics of par-
ticipatory employment practices, by proposing to reduce the frequency of
JLMC meetings and shorten the length of each meeting from four to two
hours.
2.3.2 The Nature of Employee Participation at JLMCs
The basic nature of employee participation at JLMCs can be summa-
rized as “consultation on business strategies and plans, yet joint determi-
nation on their implementation.” Speciﬁcally, labor representatives ask for
and receive detailed justiﬁcations for business strategies and plans yet do
not try to change the overall framework of the plans. However, on the im-
plementation of these plans, labor representatives decide jointly with man-
agement when the plans have signiﬁcant eﬀects on employees.
For example, at ﬁrm A, during management council meetings and sub-
committee meetings on production, management explains and the union
asks questions. The union receives detailed explanations from manage-
ment on business strategies and plans (including investment, opening and
closing of plants, sales and production plans, introduction of new prod-
ucts) during management council meetings and committee meetings on
production. The union then asks questions, in particular asking for justiﬁ-
cations for these plans, but does not try to change the overall framework of
the plans. Our primary union interviewee of ﬁrm A stated plainly, “We do
not have any right to change these plans. We do not have any intention to
decide on basic business strategies jointly with management.” As a result,
it is rare for union representatives to oﬀer alternative plans to management
insofar as basic business strategies are concerned. Nonetheless, union rep-
resentatives sometimes oﬀer ideas about what kinds of products may sell.
Our personnel interviewee recalled that union representatives suggested
that some redundant factory workers could support the sales department
by handing out sales ad ﬂiers.
However, when they discuss the consequences for employees of these
business strategies and plans during restructuring meetings, production
meetings, and individual item meetings, they decide jointly with manage-
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years ago from top management to union representatives during their
management council meetings. Although the union did ask many detailed
questions about why these steps were necessary, they did not try to change
the decision to close the plant and outsource. Instead, they successfully ne-
gotiated with top management during restructuring meetings to delay the
plant closure for several months and to get favorable conditions for those
employees who were transferred as a result of the plant’s closure and out-
sourcing. For example, when employees are transferred to subsidiaries,
they usually face poorer working conditions, such as lower wages and
longer working hours. The union negotiated diligently during JLMC meet-
ings to set up a policy of minimizing changes in working conditions as a re-
sult of transfers to subsidiaries.
In the 1990s, however, in response to worsening ﬁrm performance, dis-
cussion on basic business strategies and plans between management and
labor became more extensive and intensive. Unions tend to ask more and
harder questions on basic ﬁrm performance and business strategies, such
as why a certain product is not selling or why the ﬁrm has so much debt.
This reﬂected an increased interest and concern in the overall ﬁrm perfor-
mance and hence employment security among employees. Nonetheless,
there have not been any major changes in the overall nature of employee
participation at JLMCs, that is, consultation on business strategies and
plans yet joint determination on their implementation.
To repeat, in all cases neither management nor the union viewed the
JLMC as a joint decision-making mechanism through which management
and labor decide jointly on basic business strategies. However, both recog-
nized that decisions made by management rarely turn out to seem “unrea-
sonable” in the eyes of the employees. First, management and union repre-
sentatives, in particular the top three union oﬃcials, tend to engage in
extensive informal prenegotiation prior to formal JLMC meetings. As a re-
sult, management proposals submitted to JLMCs have already been re-
vised to incorporate input from the union. Second, when management
works out its business strategies, it is fully aware of what will be viewed as
“unreasonable” by employees and thus tends to avoid proposing unrea-
sonable plans for fear of destroying its good working relationship with the
union, or wasting time and eﬀort by lengthy and costly negotiations.
For example, at ﬁrm B, during management council meetings, man-
agement explains its production plans, introduction of new equipment,
temporary and permanent closing of plants and equipment, and major
organizational changes. The union asks for management’s justiﬁcations.
Labor-management committee meetings deal with more direct labor issues
such as staﬃng, worksharing, transfers, layoﬀs, and beneﬁts. Naturally, the
union is often asked for its views on various issues and sometimes oﬀers al-
ternative plans. According to collective agreement, unlike collective bar-
64 Takao Katogaining (which deals only with wages and changes in collective agreement),
management may implement its plans even if no agreement is reached with
labor. However, our primary personnel interviewee of ﬁrm B reported that
management rarely has to resort to this clause in order to implement its
plans. He oﬀered two reasons. First, according to our primary personnel in-
terviewee, the union is very well informed about the competitive environ-
ment of the ﬁrm, and its overall understanding of current market conditions
is close to that of management. Second, management and top union oﬃ-
cials engage in extensive informal communication prior to JLMC meetings,
and actual plans proposed by management in various formal meetings of-
ten have already been modiﬁed to incorporate union input. If the union ob-
jects strongly to management’s plans, then management—rather than
resorting to its right to implement without an agreement—is likely to
withdraw its plans. Our union interviewee of ﬁrm B conﬁrmed this point.
2.3.3 Employee Interest in JLMCs
Interest in JLMCs among employees rose in the 1990s. For example, at
ﬁrm A, participation in union meetings increased in general. In particular,
white-collar union members at the headquarters were traditionally some-
what apathetic to the newsletters unions use to disseminate the information
shared at JLMCs. In the last few years, however, they have started to read
these newsletters more often and more carefully. Our primary personnel
interviewee of ﬁrm B felt that the union is taking JLMCs more seriously,
and that the union’s need for getting good information at JLMCs and for
understanding and explaining that information well to its members are in-
creasing in the face of increased competition. This point was conﬁrmed by
our primary union interviewee. Employees are more sensitive to ﬁrm per-
formance and competitive environment. The rising employee interest in
JLMCs was observed for ﬁrm C, a medium-sized, privately owned ﬁrm.
Our union interviewee believed that general employee interest in JLMCs
rose in the 1990s. Lately he had received more feedback (personal letters to
him concerning the proceedings of JLMC meetings that are distributed to
all union members). He even received requests from plant-level managers
to send the proceedings to them. More important, our union interviewee
felt an increasing desire among the employees for the union to help man-
agement make good decisions through JLMCs.
2.3.4 The Importance of SFCs
In general, the management philosophy of large Japanese ﬁrms in recent
years has been leaning toward more-decentralized decision making. In
other words, the power and authority of headquarters has been weakening
while the power and authority of business units has been rising. In parallel
to this trend, the importance of SFCs, or information sharing at the grass-
roots level, appears to be rising.
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ﬂoor consists of about 50 to 100 employees). The ﬁrm used to have no for-
mal standing shop ﬂoor committees, although upon request from the
union each shop ﬂoor did hold committee meetings occasionally. In spring
1996, the union felt a need for better communication at the shop-ﬂoor level
and requested the ﬁrm to establish more formal, standing SFCs and to
hold regular meetings. Management and the union jointly decided to es-
tablish more formal SFCs and to hold regular meetings (with a target of
three to four times a year for white-collar shop ﬂoors and once a month for
blue-collar shop ﬂoors). Since then, the union has been gathering monthly
data on the incidence of meetings at each shop ﬂoor. As shown in table 2.3,
for the last two years, the average SFCs met four times a year. The inci-
dence of meetings, however, has been far from uniform. Our union inter-
viewee remarked that there are negative correlations between the number
of SFC meetings and the number of shop-ﬂoor complaints made to upper-
level union organizations.
At ﬁrm A, SFCs have two functions: (a) resolving shop-ﬂoor-level work
condition issues (such as air conditioning, smoking vs. nonsmoking envi-
ronments, bathrooms, paid vacations, and cafeteria menus), and (b) giving
explanations of shop-ﬂoor production plans and related staﬃng issues by
a manager in charge of the shop ﬂoor. The link between JLMCs and SFCs
is strong. First, what is not resolved at SFCs goes up to JLMCs (at the es-
tablishment level). (For example, labor representatives requested the intro-
duction of air conditioners to its shop ﬂoor during SFC meetings. How-
ever, a manager in charge of the shop ﬂoor did not have the budget to pay
for them. The issue was discussed at the next JLMC meetings at the estab-
lishment level, and top management of the establishment decided to pur-
chase several spot air conditioners for the shop ﬂoor.) Second, SFCs dis-
cuss shop-ﬂoor production plans, which are derived from establishment
production plans that are discussed during JLMC meetings at the estab-
lishment level.
The meetings are held outside regular working hours and usually last
one to two hours. More time is usually spent on the ﬁrst function of re-
solving shop-ﬂoor work condition issues than on the second function of
discussing shop-ﬂoor plans.
Both our union and personnel interviewees recognized the beneﬁt of
SFCs and their increasing importance in the future. Employees are gener-
ally interested in SFCs. However, if SFCs fail to produce concrete results,
such as satisfactory resolution of employee requests for air conditioning,
employees tend to lose interest in SFCs quickly.
Our personnel interviewee considered the beneﬁt of SFCs quite sub-
stantial. Complaints that are resolved at SFC meetings are not really earth-
shattering, but when they are resolved employees can actually see, feel, and






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Grievance procedures deal with personal complaints that cannot be ex-
pressed in public. For example, those who feel their bosses give them un-
fairly low subjective performance evaluations never voice their complaints
at SFC meetings but submit their complaints to grievance committees.
Our personnel interviewee stressed the importance of the manager’s
ability to communicate for successful SFCs, and pointed out that some
SFCs do not function well due to the manager’s lack of ability to listen to
labor representatives. When managers lack the ability to listen, SFCs be-
come an extension of regular supervisor-supervisee relationships and la-
bor representatives do not feel at ease expressing their views—hence the
SFCs stagnate.
Establishment P of ﬁrm A holds its SFC meetings at the section level
(about 500 employees). Section Q regularly holds an oﬀ-hours meeting on
a monthly basis. These usually last one hour. In addition, upon request of
the section’s union representative, additional meetings can be held. During
the previous year, section Q held two meetings a month on average. Our
foreman interviewee added that it had been an unusually busy year in
terms of SFCs.
The section chief and all foremen attend the SFC meetings. The union
representatives for the section also attend. Once a month, the union repre-
sentatives for the section hold a meeting of union representatives for kakari
to prepare for their SFC meeting for that month. Three days prior to the
meeting, a written list of suggested discussion topics are given to the sec-
tion chief. Work environment issues, such as shower rooms, water leaks,
smoking, bathrooms, cafeterias, and air conditioning, are of central con-
cern for their SFC meetings. There is no discussion of production plans at
the section level. This is somewhat diﬀerent from what our personnel and
union interviewees explained. The operation of SFCs appears to be left to
each shop ﬂoor, and there seems to be quite a variation in the actual oper-
ation of SFCs among various shop ﬂoors. There was no major change in
SFCs at this section in the 1990s.
2.3.5 Enduring SGAs
We did not ﬁnd any evidence for a major decline in the quantity and
quality of SGAs. For example, at ﬁrm A, the ﬁrm currently has 2,090 QC
circles, amounting to 10.6 employees per circle. In 1965, the ﬁrst QC circles
were registered in establishment P. Since then, QC circles have been estab-
lished at each new plant upon its opening. The union is neither negative
nor positive about these SGAs. Part-timers are not included, and the ﬁrm
maintains the voluntary nature of QC circles. Thus, activities are held af-
ter hours and there is no compensation for those hours. Not all employees
volunteer to participate (e.g., older employees approaching retirement
tend not to participate). Our personnel interviewee spent two and a half
years as a plant-level personnel manager and did not recall any sign of stag-
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stagnation of SGAs is that employees are generally very proud of the suc-
cess of their groups. When a group wins the annual QC circle contest, its
members usually have a major celebration and are extremely proud. The
sense of pride seems to have carried them through over the last three
decades. Our personnel interviewee was somewhat concerned about the fu-
ture of SGAs, since it is uncertain whether new generations of Japanese
workers will continue to participate in them wholeheartedly largely for the
sense of group pride.
Most recently, however, plants have not been very busy and QC activi-
ties have been somewhat stagnant. Our personnel interviewee argued that
when plants are not busy, possible sources of productivity and product
quality improvements tend to be disguised. The SGAs for white-collar oc-
cupations have not been as active and successful as those for blue-collar oc-
cupations.
Neither our personnel interviewee nor our union interviewee was aware
of any relationship between SGAs and SFCs, except that both take place
at the shop-ﬂoor level. As a result of aging of the labor force, which was ac-
celerated by limited hiring in the last few years (the average age of employ-
ees at this ﬁrm rose from thirty-seven to forty in the last decade), the
transmittal of the skills and ethos of SGAs to the next generation is in-
creasingly becoming a major concern.
We were very fortunate to be able to spend half a day in establishment P
of ﬁrm A, observing the actual operations of shop ﬂoors and QC circles
and interviewing a veteran foreman. The smallest organizational unit of es-
tablishment P is called a han. Each han consists of ﬁfteen to twenty em-
ployees, and the kocho is in charge of each han. In addition to the kocho,
each han normally has one to two shidoin and four leaders. Each leader is
in charge of one of the four main objectives: (a) safety, (b) high quality, (c)
cost reduction, and (d) punctual delivery. Each leader will carry out vari-
ous activities to achieve the assigned goal. These activities may take the
form of SGAs. At any rate, these activities are not voluntary, are fully di-
rected by the kocho, and are part of work, and hence are done during reg-
ular hours. On the other hand, a QC circle is voluntary; and depending on
the project, it will change its QC captain, who is not necessarily a leader
(people with one year of tenure can and will become QC circle captains).
Projects are also chosen by circle members with some indirect guidance
from the kocho. Each QC circle carries out six to twelve projects a year.
On average, each QC circle meets four to six times a month and each
meeting lasts one to one and a half hours. Sometimes, for other activities
(such as safety, cost reduction, and punctual delivery), each employee
spends two to three hours a month after regular hours. All these after-
hours activities are considered voluntary and are thus without pay. In ad-
dition, for a couple of hours a month, on average, employees are also en-
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tivities, they are paid at an overtime premium rate. Each employee’s per-
formance in all these activities, including voluntary QC circles, is evaluated
by the kocho.
Our foreman interviewee believed that QC circle activities are more ac-
tive and more voluntary then ten years earlier. For example, in the 1980s,
the ﬁrm used to provide some modest compensation for QC activities.
However, in the 1990s, the ﬁrm abolished this QC circle compensation and
made it clear that QC activities were voluntary. Both the quantity and qual-
ity of QC activities increased substantially in the 1990s. To meet increasing
needs for more technically sophisticated projects and quick turnaround
time, the ﬁrm introduced a special full-time kaizengroup (a handful of vet-
eran workers) who could perform some experiments for various ideas sug-
gested by QC circles. Our interviewee attributed this rise in the quantity
and quality of QC activities to the increased competition and sense of cri-
sis among employees: “Our means for living have been threatened by the
increased competition and if we do not produce a better and cheaper prod-
uct, we will lose out.” In other words, employee interest in SGAs has clearly
increased. Our foreman interviewee strongly believed that ideas for im-
provement have not been exhausted.
Firm B has a long history of SGAs, dating back to 1962. The ﬁrm out-
lines the purposes for its SGAs as follows:
• To organize voluntary group activities by employees in equal positions
and on the basis of each employee’s voluntary participation.
• To select themes at each job site and to attain goals.
• To realize each employee’s self-fulﬁllment in his job through improve-
ment of ability and demonstration of creativity.
• To build respect for fellow employees and to create an energetic job
site with a happy atmosphere.
• To  contribute to the development of the company’s businesses,
thereby contributing to society.
According to the statistics provided by the ﬁrm, there is no evidence for
stagnation of SGAs in the 1990s. The total number of SGA groups de-
clined from close to 4,000 in 1992 to close to 2,500 in 1997 as the ﬁrm has
downsized its labor force. However, since the number of SGA groups did
not fall as fast as the total number of employees, the number of groups per
employee (dividing the total number of SGA groups by the total number of
employees) increased during this time period.
The total number of projects completed during each year also dimin-
ished, from 22,000 in 1992 to 16,000 in 1997. Nonetheless, the number of
projects completed per group actually rose from 5.86 to 6.40 because the
total number of SGA groups fell faster than the total number of projects
completed. The proportion of blue-collar workers participating in SGAs
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sign either of a declining employee participation rate in SGAs or of a di-
minishing number of projects completed by each group. We failed to ob-
tain any systematic data on the quality of the projects over time at ﬁrm B.
2.3.6 Employee Commitment to ESOPs
There is some evidence for weakening commitment of employees to
ESOPs. For example, ﬁrm A has a standard ESOP with 5 percent subsidy
from the ﬁrm. The ESOP participation rate (proportion of the labor force
participating in an ESOP) remained around 30 percent in the 1980s. The
ﬁrm embarked on a major ESOP promotion campaign during 1987, and as
a result the ESOP participation rate jumped to 70–80 percent. Since then
it has been falling steadily, and it is currently a little below 50 percent. The
share price of the ﬁrm is currently one-third of what it was in 1989. Many
employees who joined the ESOP during the ﬁrm’s ESOP promotion cam-
paign in 1987 are experiencing substantial capital loss. For 1998, the ﬁrm
experienced over 1,000 employees exiting from the ESOP for reasons other
than separation from the ﬁrm, and only 204 people joined the ESOP.
The initial objective of the ESOP at ﬁrm A was threefold: (a) enhancing
the sense of participation and motivating employees, (b) providing a source
of retirement income, and (c) acquiring a stable shareholder group. With
substantial capital loss in the 1990s and highly volatile share prices in recent
years, our personnel interviewee felt that the ESOP’s ability to achieve its
objectives diminished in the 1990s. The average contribution of participants
is 5,000 to 10,000 yen from monthly pay and 20,000 to 30,000 yen from
bonus.
Firm B has a similar situation. It introduced its ESOP in September
1988, which is unusually late compared to its competitors who introduced
their ESOPs in the 1970s. During the ﬁrst year of its ESOP, over 4,000 em-
ployees signed up for it. However, only 800 employees joined during the
next two years. To boost the ESOP membership, the ﬁrm introduced a
standard 5 percent subsidy in 1993. Close to 1,500 employees joined dur-
ing that year. However, since then, on average, fewer than 100 employees
joined each year. Currently, only about 10 percent of the labor force in the
ﬁrm participates in its ESOP and 0.2 percent of the total number of out-
standing shares are owned by its ESOP. The share price of the ﬁrm is one-
quarter of what it was in 1989. Many employees who joined the ESOP dur-
ing the ﬁrm’s ESOP introduction year are experiencing substantial capital
loss. Our primary personnel interviewee attributed the ﬁrm’s low ESOP
participation rate to a combination of rapidly falling share prices and
falling income of employees.
To  shed further light on the nature of the recent transformation of
ESOPs, we were able to obtain unusually rich data on the subject from ﬁrm
D, a large manufacturing ﬁrm with sales of a few trillion yen (about one-
third of which was export sales) and employment of close to 40,000 work-
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change. Unlike the ﬁrst three ﬁrms, ﬁrm D’s sales and employment did not
fall dramatically in the 1990s although its share price did fall as drastically
as those of the other ﬁrms over the same time period.
Firm D introduced its ESOP in 1971. Like in the case of ﬁrm A, the ini-
tial objective of the ESOP was threefold: (a) enhancing the sense of partic-
ipation and motivating employees, (b) providing a source of retirement in-
come, and (c) acquiring a stable shareholder group. By the end of 1980, the
ESOP participation rate reached one in four employees and the average
monthly contribution reached 13,000 in 1995 yen. Since 1990, the partici-
pation rate has fallen to almost one in ﬁve employees. The average monthly
contribution also decreased in the early 1990s to less than 12,000 yen, and
the subsequent recovery has not been strong.
The falling ESOP participation rate is accounted for by a decrease in
new participants and an increase in exiting participants. The number of
new participants has fallen from nearly 1,000 a year in 1990 to a little over
200 a year in 1998. On the other hand, the number of exiting participants
doubled from 400 in 1990 to 800 in 1998. It follows that in 1998, there was
a net loss of 600 participants. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to
ﬁnd out how many of these exiting participants were exiting from the trust
while remaining in the ﬁrm and thus were “voluntarily leaving the ESOP
trust.” However, according to our primary interviewee in personnel, nearly
all exiting participants were also leaving the ﬁrm.
However, ESOP participants, although remaining in the trust, ﬁne-
tuned their commitments to the trust by changing their monthly contribu-
tions. During 1990, as shown in ﬁgure 2.5, more than 1,000 continuing par-
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Fig. 2.5 ESOP participants who reduced and increased contributions: Firm Dticipants increased their monthly contributions, whereas only 100 reduced
their monthly contributions. In the early 1990s, fewer and fewer of these
continuing participants were increasing their monthly contributions and
more and more were reducing them. By 1993, the number of those reduc-
ing their monthly contributions became nearly identical to the number in-
creasing them. Since then, the number of those increasing their contribu-
tions has stopped falling, whereas the number reducing their contributions
has declined somewhat. As a result, during 1998 there were still more con-
tinuing participants who increased their contributions than those who
reduced them. However, the diﬀerence between the two (about 100) was
much smaller than it used to be in early 1990s (e.g., more than 900 in
1990). In short, although most ESOP participants remain in the trust un-
less they separate from the ﬁrm, fewer participants increase their contri-
butions to the trust and more reduce their contributions. The overall com-
mitment of ESOP participants to the trust appears to be falling somewhat
as a result of worsening stock performance of the ﬁrm.
2.3.7 Complementarity of Employment Practices11
We asked both our union and personnel manager interviewees the fol-
lowing question: Suppose it is necessary to streamline and downsize a set
of participatory employment practices consisting of JLMCs (at the head-
quarters level and at the establishment level), SFCs, SGAs, ESOPs, and
PSPs. Would it be possible to eliminate one of those employment practices?
If so, which one? The general response to this question was, “It would not
be possible to take out any of the following three: JLMCs at the headquar-
ters level, JLMCs at the establishment level, and SFCs since they actually
work hand in hand.” However, when pressed to choose one of those three
to eliminate, our union interviewee of ﬁrm A mentioned that he would
choose SFCs because in the past industrial relations did work ﬁne without
them. Our personnel interviewee’s response turned out to be almost iden-
tical. However, he added that SFCs are not really costly (they are held out-
side regular working hours) and that their positive morale eﬀects would be
rather substantial. In other words, according to him, SFCs are probably
the most cost eﬀective participatory practice. In addition, he anticipated
that in the future, as decentralization of the ﬁrm progresses, the impor-
tance of JLMCs at the headquarters level will naturally diminish and the
importance of establishment-level JLMCs and SFCs will increase.
Our ﬁeld research also revealed two kinds of complementary relations
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11. For complementarity of various employment practices, see, for instance, Fitzroy and Kraft
(1987); Weitzman and Kruse (1990); Levine and Tyson (1990); Jones and Pliskin (1991); Ben-Ner
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(2003); and articles featured in a special issue of Industrial Relations (July 1996, vol. 35).between collective bargaining and JLMCs: (a) complementarity in scope
and (b) complementarity in time. According to the complementarity-in-
scope model, collective bargaining deals with wages, bonuses, working
hours, and agreement revision whereas JLMCs deal with all other items.
Thus, depending on an item to be discussed, either JLMCs or collective
bargaining will be used. According to the complementarity-in-time model,
all items will be discussed ﬁrst at JLMCs and collective bargaining will be
used only when JLMCs cannot resolve diﬀerences between management
and labor. The majority of our ﬁrms subscribe to the complementarity-in-
scope model. No ﬁrm suggested that they are substitutes.
2.3.8 Gap between Full-Time Union Oﬃcials and the Rank and File
For JLMCs to work well, management needs to prove credibly that it
trusts union representatives by providing them with conﬁdential informa-
tion. Based on our observations of top union oﬃcials, it seems to be almost
impossible to continue to deceive them by providing them with superﬁcial
information while claiming it to be “conﬁdential.” It appears to be the case
that top management does provide top union oﬃcials with truly conﬁden-
tial information. By the very nature of conﬁdentiality, top management
cannot allow such information to go beyond top union oﬃcials since it will
be prohibitively costly to monitor the information ﬂow of all employees.
Thus, management asks top union oﬃcials to keep such information
among themselves. A problem with this solution is that it produces a gap
between top union oﬃcials and the rank-and-ﬁle employees. When the lat-
ter ﬁnd out about important business decisions such as alliance with an-
other ﬁrm from newspapers and television instead of hearing about it from
their own management, they will naturally be upset that management
would release such important information to the media before releasing it
to its own employees. When that happens, the employees will ask their
union oﬃcials whether they knew. When the union oﬃcials deny it, sooner
or later the rank and ﬁle start to consider their own union oﬃcials as in-
competent or, even worse, as working for management and not for the em-
ployees. Eventually, a good, cooperative relationship between labor and
management will turn into a complicated, not always cooperative, three-
way relationship among the rank and ﬁle, union oﬃcials, and top manage-
ment. We are not suggesting this is actually happening in our sample ﬁrms;
we are simply pointing out a possible cause for the breakdown of the sys-
tem of participatory employment practices.
2.3.9 Overloaded Labor Representatives and Limited
Supply of Full-Time Union Oﬃcials
Many ﬁrms have been downsizing. For example, ﬁrm A reduced its la-
bor force by more than 30 percent in the 1990s. To keep pace with this
downsizing, the number of full-time union oﬃcials in ﬁrm A has also fallen
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not diminished accordingly. Rather they have recently intensiﬁed. This is
making full-time union oﬃcials exceedingly busy while there is no suﬃ-
cient monetary compensation for this increased work load. For example,
our secondary union interviewees at ﬁrm A complained that the amount of
work they were asked to do had recently increased substantially, and they
appeared to be looking forward to returning to some management posi-
tions within the ﬁrm after their current union posts end.
If this trend of overloading of labor representatives continues in the fu-
ture, the system of participatory employment practices may break down.
First, labor representatives may not be as well prepared for JLMC meetings
as before since they are simply too busy. Second, the increased work load
with no monetary compensation for it makes union posts somewhat less at-
tractive to young, capable employees (who are increasingly becoming scarce
due to the aging of the labor force in general). In addition, substantially di-
minished employment opportunities outside the ﬁrm may make full-time
union oﬃcials more dependent on the ﬁrm for their future employment af-
ter they have ﬁnished their union posts. Furthermore, as a result of down-
sizing, managers may become more reluctant to send their best people from
their organizations to union posts. All these things may make labor repre-
sentatives for JLMCs less eﬀective and less committed to the interest of the
rank and ﬁle. Without well-prepared, ﬁrmly committed, and eﬀective labor
representatives, JLMCs will become a mere formality. A real danger to the
survival of participatory employment practices might come not from man-
agement but from union. If participatory employment practices disappear
from Japanese ﬁrms in the future, it might be due not to management ini-
tiatives but to the lack of capable and committed labor representatives.
2.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that participatory employment practices
appear to be generally surviving the economic slowdown of the 1990s,
whereas subtle yet potentially important changes in their attributes are
taking place.
Kato and Morishima (2002) provide econometric evidence for the com-
plementarity of these participatory employment practices. Terminating a
single practice may not only eliminate its own positive eﬀect but reduce
the positive eﬀects of other practices. In the extreme case, the termination
of a single practice may cause the whole system of employee participation
and labor-management cooperation to halt. For example, it was found that
the goal alignment process needed to be supported by both direct meth-
ods (ﬁnancial participation) and indirect ones (employee participation
and involvement). Removing ﬁnancial participation will cause employee
participation and involvement to be ineﬀective and vice versa. Further-
more, we found it is necessary for participation to take place not only at
76 Takao Katothe top level but at the grassroots level. Discontinuing participation at the
grassroots level will cause participation at the top level to be ineﬀective,
and vice versa.
Moreover, research points to the importance of taking a long-term per-
spective in evaluating the success of participatory employment practices.
Coupled with the importance of the long-term perspective, the comple-
mentarity of participatory employment practices will probably make indi-
vidual practices in Japan more enduring than the popular rhetoric of “the
end of Japanese employment practices” suggests. Our ﬁndings on the re-
sponses of Japanese ﬁrms in their use of participatory employment prac-
tices to the economic slowdown in the 1990s do point to the enduring
nature of such practices for large, unionized ﬁrms. Such Japanese ﬁrms
appear to be responding to the 1990s slowdown and to the recent ﬁnancial
crisis in particular by ﬁne-tuning the existing practices, not by dismantling
them. For small to medium-sized ﬁrms with no unions, we ﬁnd some evi-
dence of management’s trying to weaken the role of employee participa-
tion. Combined with the rising proportion of the nonunion sector in the
Japanese economy, the overall importance of participation in the Japanese
economy may be falling.
There are a few early signs of trouble even for large, unionized ﬁrms that
might eventually result in the breakdown of the system if left untreated.
First, the number of full-time union oﬃcials has been falling as a result of
continued downsizing of ﬁrms’ labor forces. The amount of time and eﬀort
that union oﬃcials need to put into participatory employment practices
have not been falling. This often results in an uncompensated increase in
work load for union oﬃcials. If this trend continues, labor representatives
for JLMCs will become less prepared and less committed to the interest of
the rank and ﬁle, and thus less eﬀective. Second, at least in our medium-
sized ﬁrm case, top management is ﬁnding its participatory management
system detrimental to timely and eﬃcient management, and has begun to
streamline the system. Overloaded union oﬃcials may oﬀer less resistance
to such management initiatives. Third, the current system tends to produce
a gap in the quantity and quality of information acquired from manage-
ment between top union oﬃcials and their general membership. It is con-
ceivable that such a gap may eventually result in the breakdown of the
system. These are still preliminary observations. Clearly, more work is nec-
essary to ﬁnd more deﬁnitive answers to these important questions.
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